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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing throughout the early 
1990s, a widely enforced city of Miami ordinance prohibited people 
from sleeping in public and on the private property of others without 
their consent.1  Around that time, there were roughly 6000 homeless 
people, but only enough shelter space for fewer than 700 people.2  
And these were the statistics before the first winds of Hurricane 
Andrew began to blow and the first house collapsed.  The storm 
eventually ripped through the south of Florida on an unprecedented 
path of destruction, leaving upwards of 200,000 people homeless in its 
catastrophic aftermath.3  At the time the public-sleeping ordinance 
was enforced, the vast majority of the city’s homeless population had 
nowhere to sleep.4  It was impossible for them to obey the law. 
In this Article, the central issue is how difficult—and sometimes 
impossible—it can be for homeless people to obey the law on a 
consistent basis, compared to those with access to housing, and why 
this is objectionable.  Examining this issue is of fundamental 
importance because imposing laws which people may not be able to 
consistently avoid breaking undermines the legitimacy of holding 
people accountable for their behavior through punishment, disregards 
their dignity and autonomy, and undermines the law.5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 2. Id. at 1553, 1558. 
 3. Id. at 1158–59. 
 4. Id. at 1580–81. 
 5. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 22–24 (2d ed. 2008). 
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This Article is focused on prohibitions against conduct the 
homeless may not be able to avoid engaging in as part of their 
existence, such as sleeping in public, begging, and loitering.6  It is not 
concerned with laws that are impossible for the entire population to 
obey, which, as Lon Fuller once observed, “no sane lawmaker, not 
even the most evil dictator, would have any reason to enact.”7  
Instead, the analysis is more focused on the selective enforcement of 
laws against the homeless and whether they may not be able to 
avoid breaking certain laws that regulate conduct characteristic of 
their condition.8 
The law can be practically impossible for the homeless to obey in 
three contexts.  First, some individual laws—like the Miami city 
ordinance mentioned earlier that banned sleeping in public—
comprehensively prohibit behaviors which homeless people cannot 
avoid engaging in as part of their daily existence because of a lack of 
alternatives that would make obeying the law possible.9 
Second, in some cases, the law imposes narrow prohibitions against 
certain behavior which, individually, may each be possible to obey.  
However, the cumulative effects of these ordinances as well as 
property laws can amount to the near-equivalent of a comprehensive 
ban on prohibited activities where few legal alternatives exist.10  My 
contention is that in such contexts it can be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for the homeless to exist without being penalized even 
though people with access to housing would have no such problems. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and 
Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, 29 ANTIPODE 303, 307 
(1997); David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge To Homeless 
Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 487, 492 (1994). 
 7. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 70 (1964). 
 8. See Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of 
Sight-Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of 
Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145, 147 (1999); Tami Iwamoto, 
Note, Adding Insult to Injury: Criminalization of Homelessness in Los Angeles, 29 
WHITTIER L. REV. 515, 522–23 (2007). 
 9. See Smith, supra note 6, at 492 (citing examples of behaviors related to the 
daily existence of homeless persons that are illegal). 
 10. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 295, 315–16 (1991); James Duncan, Editor’s Note, Men Without Property: The 
Tramp’s Classification and the Use of Urban Space, THE URBAN SOCIOLOGY 
READER 225 (Jan Lin & Christopher Mele eds., 2013) (discussing constant police 
surveillance); see also Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, Challenging 
Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, ADVANCING 
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 171–72 (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., 2014) 
(noting how the visibility of the homeless renders them more likely to be penalized). 
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Third, quality of life offenses can regulate nearly every act the 
homeless engage in, including their movement, presence in different 
places, and even their sleep.11  Because the homeless are constantly in 
the jurisdiction where these laws are enforced, it may be impossible 
for them to avoid a selective or discretionary enforcement of the laws 
against them, even though people with access to housing would not 
have comparable difficulty. 
This Article has four parts.  Part I briefly examines why it is 
important for individuals to be able to follow the laws to which they 
are subjected.  In light of those reasons, Part II looks at examples of 
individual prohibitions that may be impossible to obey, including laws 
comprehensively prohibiting sleeping in public, camping in public, 
and panhandling.  Part III demonstrates that the homeless may not be 
able to avoid breaking cumulative individual prohibitions against 
different conducts in addition to laws which are selectively enforced.  
This Article concludes by considering the legal consequences of these 
laws.  Notably, in Part IV, I build on the work of Jeremy Waldron and 
argue that the defense of necessity should generally not be invoked in 
cases where it is practically impossible to obey the law.12  Rather, 
invoking the issue of practical impossibility can be the foundation for 
contesting the constitutionality of laws, can lead to granting 
injunctions against the enforcement of laws disproportionately 
affecting the homeless, and can stimulate policy change in how laws 
are applied against the homeless. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ABLE TO OBEY THE LAW 
A. Impossibility, Autonomy, and Self-Determination 
Discussions regarding the importance of being able to obey the law 
can be traced as far back as Roman law.13  More recently, several 
prominent contemporary legal theorists have addressed the issue in 
different contexts.  Lon Fuller has argued that a fundamental 
characteristic of the law is that it should not require those subjected 
to it to do, or refrain from doing, the impossible.14  In his view, the 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Iwamoto, supra note 8, at 522–23. 
 12. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, in FROM 
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) [hereinafter Why 
Indigence Is Not a Justification]. 
 13. See e.g., David Daube, Greek and Roman Reflections on Impossible Laws, 12 
NAT’L L. F. 1, 4 (1967); Robert Henle, Principles of Legality: Qualities of Law—Lon 
Fuller, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Isidore of Seville, 39 AM. JURIS. 47, 60–62 (1994). 
 14. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162. 
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issue of impossibility is not limited to laws which generally cannot be 
observed by the entire population, but rather, adopting an individual 
capacity-oriented approach, extends the principle to “rules that 
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party.”15  More 
directly, he ties the importance of being able to obey the law to the 
notions of autonomy and dignity.16 
With respect to autonomy, in Fuller’s view the law ought to treat 
individuals as responsible and autonomous agents, meaning that the 
law recognizes their capacity to shape their own future and act as 
rational agents in making decisions.17  This implies that the law must 
recognize how individuals live their lives and shape their own futures 
in accordance with the rules that guide the legality of their behavior.18  
For example, H.L.A. Hart analogized the law to a choosing system in 
which the population is informed of the rules in advance, made aware 
of the consequences of breaking them, and punished for choosing to 
violate them.19  In such a system, individual freedom is maximized 
because people can weigh the consequences of breaking the law, with 
the choice of doing so being left up to them.20  But when laws are 
impossible to obey, people never know when they will be punished 
and it makes it far more difficult to plan their lives.21  The fact that 
breaking an impossible law is inevitable also makes the enforcement 
of these rules a sort of unexpected ambush,22 where individuals lose 
peace of mind as they wait to be punished for a situation they cannot 
avoid.  Such rules demean one’s capacity for self-determination 
because they send the message that no matter how rationally one 
behaves or how hard one tries to obey the rules in place, they will 
inevitably fail and it can lead to negative consequences.  Arresting or 
punishing people for violating these types of rules implies that 
individuals who are not able to obey the law are in fact making 
conscious and rational choices to break it.  To draw an analogy 
described by Martha Nussbaum, the rules disingenuously treat those 
who are starving as if they have food but are choosing to fast.23 
                                                                                                                 
 15. FULLER, supra note 7, at 39. 
 16. Id. at 162. 
 17. Id. at 39, 162. 
 18. HART, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
 19. Id. at 22–23. 
 20. Id. at 23. 
 21. Id. at 23–24. 
 22. See John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 70 
(A.P. Simester ed., 2005). 
 23. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 273, 289 (1997). 
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B. Impossibility, Dignity, and Opportunities 
That it is impossible for only some people—or certain groups of 
people—to obey the law also raises important dignity-related 
concerns.  Dignity implies that all individuals have inherent worth as 
members of the human community and are deserving of respect and 
concern as moral beings.24  As Jeremy Waldron has argued, it can be 
construed as a type of normative status recognizing the “high and 
equal rank of every human person”25 and that people’s freedom 
should not be limited as an unwilling means to the ends of others.26  
Dignity is therefore closely tied to the notion of equality.27  For 
instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that dignity is 
an important aspect of the constitutional right to equal treatment 
before the law.28  Dignity celebrates what makes individuals different 
from one another and strives to treat them as equals, rather than 
using these differences as a justification for treating them as if they 
were less worthy of respect or concern.29  Together, the notions of 
dignity and equality set a sort of floor for how people should be 
treated in a way that recognizes their high value as rational human 
beings of equal worth.30 
If the law takes these notions seriously, it must recognize that there 
are people in our society who do not have the same basic capacities 
and opportunities to obey the law like everyone else.31  Hart famously 
explained the moral objection to punishing those who did not have 
the basic capacities (physical and mental) and opportunities to obey 
the law when he argued: 
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when 
they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing 
what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK AND RIGHTS 49 (Meir Dan-Cohen 
ed., 2012) (citing Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497, ¶ 51 (Can.)); Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 66 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 65, 76 (2011) (describing Kant’s traditional notion of dignity). 
 25. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 14. 
 26. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 27–28 (2015). 
 27. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977). 
 28. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 171 (Can.) (finding the 
constitutional right under Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 15 
(U.K.)); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 571–72 (Can.) (same). 
 29. See Andrews, 1 S.C.R. 143 at 171. 
 30. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 29. 
 31. See HART, supra note 5, at 153. 
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opportunity to exercise these capacities.  Where these capacities and 
opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied 
cases of accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity, 
etc., the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because 
‘he could not have helped it’ or ‘he could not have done otherwise’ 
or ‘he had no real choice’.32 
But there are other problems with impossible laws which extend 
beyond the mere fact that the person cannot do what is asked of them 
and it is wrong to blame them for acts they could not avoid engaging 
in and that may be morally innocent in nature.33  Notably, I am 
concerned with how requiring people to follow impossible rules 
negatively impacts their dignity and equality interests.  The fact that 
someone does not have the basic capacities or opportunities to obey 
the law like everyone else should not mean that they lose their dignity 
or right to be treated equally; it should not detract from their inherent 
worth as people or mean that they are less worthy of respect or 
consideration.34  If lack of basic opportunities diminished a person’s 
inherent value as a member of the human community, the law can be 
used as a tool to allow the majority to act as masters over those with 
fewer opportunities and who are perceived as less desirable.35  If one 
accepts Nussbaum’s capabilities approach—where individuals must 
benefit from certain capabilities in order to have a basic quality of life 
as human beings36—the law should punish people for failing to avail 
themselves of the basic opportunity to obey the law, instead of 
punishing people for failing to have the basic opportunity to obey the 
law.37 
An important aspect of being a dignified member of the human 
community also entails being able to stand up for oneself and assert 
one’s rights in an unapologetic manner.38  The central problem with 
impossible laws is that when a person stands up for themselves by 
asserting their rights, demanding their inherent value as a rational 
being be recognized, and morally protesting the fact that it is 
                                                                                                                 
 32. HART, supra note 5, at 152. 
 33. See R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at ¶¶ 29, 40 (Can.) (citing Perka v. The 
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (Can.)). 
 34. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 18–19, 24 (2011). 
 35. BARAK, supra note 26, at 27–28. 
 36. NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34. 
 37. A.P. Simester, A Disintegrated Theory of Culpability, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 184 (Dennis J. 
Baker & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013) (making an analogous argument with respect to 
capacity). 
 38. See WALDRON, supra note 24, at 29. 
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impossible for them to obey the law even though other people have 
no problem doing so, the operation of the law suggests that none of 
this matters.39  As I argue throughout the Article, these types of laws 
send a message that the life and preferences of those subjected to 
impossible laws are worth less than those who are afforded basic 
opportunities.  Furthermore, as I discuss in Part II, trying to follow 
certain rules when people do not have the capacities or opportunities 
to obey them can in fact harm certain members of society as well as 
disregard the sanctity of their life and security interests.40              
C. Lack of Fair Opportunities and Lack of Complementarity 
My concern is that by precluding the homeless from engaging in 
certain behaviors in public without the provision of reasonable and 
legal alternatives, there is a lack of fair and consistent opportunity to 
obey the law.41  Waldron has explored where the lack of a fair 
opportunity for the homeless to obey the law stems from, concluding 
that the combination of property law rules and quality of life offenses 
result in the homeless being governed by the law differently than 
people with access to housing.42  He argues that if everyone had 
access to a home, it would be fair to regulate certain life-sustaining 
conducts undertaken in public, such as urinating and sleeping, 
because they could be restricted to the private realm.43  Because of 
this possibility, public spaces could be regulated to preclude such 
activities that were undertaken complementarily to activities that 
those with homes would normally do in their own homes.44  This is 
what Waldron calls the “Complementarity Thesis.”45  However, when 
people have no access to private places because they are homeless, 
they are not undertaking these life-sustaining conducts in a 
complementary way.  Rather, it can be the primary and only place 
they can perform them.46  As a result, public spaces and the conduct 
of the homeless must be regulated in light of this fundamental 
difference: the lack of complementarity.  In Waldron’s words: 
                                                                                                                 
 39. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162–63. 
 40. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, ¶ 110 (Can. B.C.). 
 41. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 322 (discussing homeless persons’ lack of fair 
opportunity). 
 42. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 
371, 397 (2000). 
 43. Id. at 394. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 395. 
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Unfortunately, it is not appropriate for the regulation of public 
places in a society where there are large numbers of homeless 
people.  In such a society, public spaces have to be regulated on a 
somewhat different basis.  They have to be regulated in light of the 
recognition that some people have no private space - not even the 
temporary privacy that public shelters or public toilets would afford 
- to come out of or to return to.  Fairness demands that public spaces 
be regulated in light of the recognition that large numbers of people 
have no alternative but to be and remain and live all their lives in 
public.  For such persons, there is an unavoidable failure of the 
complementarity between the use of private space and the use of 
public space, and unless we are prepared to embrace the most 
egregious unfairness in the way our community polices itself in 
public, we are simply not in a position to use that complementarity 
as a basis for regulation.47 
The lack of fair opportunity for the homeless to obey the law created 
by the lack of complementarity between public and private also raises 
important concerns relating to punishment for breaking impossible 
laws.  On the one hand, because a person could not choose to obey 
the law even if they wanted, they risk being punished despite the fact 
that they may be morally innocent.48  In light of this, retribution 
cannot justify holding actors accountable through punishment in 
these cases, because people do not deserve to be punished for 
behavior they cannot avoid, or for which they are morally innocent.49  
On the other hand, the problem with enforcing laws that people 
cannot avoid breaking is that they fail in deterring the future breach 
of the same rules.50  This is particularly the case with respect to 
prohibitions against public acts that the homeless must do as part of 
their existence and cannot avoid, such as sleeping or urinating.  If a 
person has nowhere to lawfully sleep or urinate but in public, 
punishing them for doing these things in public will not prevent a 
reoccurrence, even if the punishment is harsh.51  As a result, the 
enforcement of these ordinances will necessarily be ineffective.52  As 
one author has put it: 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. 
 48. See e.g., R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 1310 (Can.); R. v. Ruzic, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, ¶¶ 29, 40 (Can.). 
 49. See Smith, supra note 6, at 495–96. 
 50. See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its 
Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 43 n.331 (1996). 
 51. See Smith, supra note 6, at 496 (citing Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 
1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). 
 52. Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. LAW. 273, 287 
(2004). 
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[A]n anti-camping ordinance, however well it passes muster under 
existing law, will be flat out ineffective to stop public sleeping if 
homeless people have no rights to be in private spaces.  The same 
can be said for statutes designed to regulate begging or loitering; the 
effectiveness of such statutes will depend directly on whether 
alternatives to the proscribed acts are realistically available.  
Ordinances designed to eliminate or curtail behaviors found 
offensive to those who are not homeless must deal with the options 
that are, or more accurately, are not available to the homeless.53 
II.  INDIVIDUAL LAWS THAT CAN BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBEY 
Many individual laws only restrict certain behaviors of homeless 
people in certain places or between specified times, and may be 
entirely possible to obey.54  The concerns that I will address in this 
section, however, relate to the extreme difficulty and impossibility in 
obeying comprehensive bans—or bans which amount to 
comprehensive prohibitions—on certain behaviors in which the 
homeless inevitably engage as part of their existence because little or 
no reasonable alternatives exist.55  These are cases of chronic 
impossibility, where both the lack of alternatives and breach of legal 
rules are persistent.  In this section, I discuss two particular 
comprehensive prohibitions: those that ban sleeping or camping in 
public places and those that prohibit panhandling. 
A. Anti-Public Sleeping Laws and Lack of Shelter 
1. Anti-Public Sleeping Laws 
The first example of laws that can be impossible for the homeless 
to obey on a consistent basis due to lack of alternatives involves 
comprehensive bans on sleeping in public or public camping when 
there is insufficient shelter space and access to housing.  Every person 
needs to sleep as part of her existence, and depriving oneself of sleep 
is harmful.56  As Waldron argues, the impossibility of obeying 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Jamie Michael Charles, Note, “America’s Lost Cause”: The 
Unconstitutionality of Criminalizing Our Country’s Homeless Population, 18 B.U. 
PUB. INT.  L.J. 315, 319 (2009). 
 55. See e.g., NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 17–18 (2014) [hereinafter 
NO SAFE PLACE]. 
 56. Michelle A. Short & Siobhan Banks, The Functional Impact of Sleep 
Deprivation, Sleep Restriction, and Sleep Fragmentation, SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND 
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comprehensive bans against sleeping in public is largely rooted in a 
lack of access to both public and private places where one can 
lawfully sleep.57  To paraphrase his words, every act that a person 
engages in has to be undertaken somewhere: either in public or on 
private property.58  Homeless people may not have access to their 
own private property or place where they can lawfully sleep.  The 
only way they can sleep on the private property of another is with the 
owner’s permission,59 even though in some cases, the law forbids 
staying on another’s private property even with permission.  For 
example, in Placerville, California, it is an offense for a property 
owner to allow someone to camp on their private property for more 
than five consecutive days, even with permission.60 
If a person does not have access to his or her own private property 
or the private property of another to lawfully sleep, their only option 
is to sleep on public property.  However, when there is a 
comprehensive ban on sleeping on public property, this option is also 
removed.61  Because homeless people can neither sleep on private 
property nor on public property, there may be nowhere they can 
lawfully sleep—there may be no alternative.  As one author has 
noted, even though these laws appear to be neutral by banning public 
sleeping for everyone, “the impact of these laws fall almost 
exclusively on the homeless, because they are the only societal group 
with no alternative to sleeping outdoors.”62  The cumulative effect of 
the lack of possibility to sleep lawfully in either public or private 
spaces is that the act of sleeping becomes entirely prohibited for the 
homeless and effectively excludes them from the jurisdiction, even if 
there is no law which comprehensively bans the activity in both public 
and private.63 
Cities have imposed comprehensive bans on sleeping in public even 
though there was insufficient shelter space.  This was the case with the 
                                                                                                                 
DISEASE: EFFECTS ON THE BODY, BRAIN AND BEHAVIOR 13 (Matt T. Bianchi ed., 
2014). 
 57. Waldron, supra note 10, at 315. 
 58. Id. at 296. 
 59. See id. at 304; see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 310. 
 60. PLACERVILLE, CAL., CITY CODE, § 6-19-3 (2014); see also NO SAFE PLACE, 
supra note 55, at 18 (citing the Placerville code). 
 61. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 315. 
 62. Charles, supra note 54, at 340. 
 63. See Waldron, supra note 42, at 397; see also Paul Ades, The 
Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in 
Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595, 
618–19 (1989). 
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Miami ordinance mentioned in the beginning of this Article, which 
prohibited sleeping “on any of the streets, sidewalks, public places or 
upon the private property of another without the consent of the 
owner thereof.”64  At the time when the ordinance was enforced, 
between 500 and 700 of the city’s 6000 homeless people had access to 
shelter space.65  Even when the city of Miami stopped enforcing the 
ordinance prohibiting public sleeping after another Florida court 
“called into question the validity of a similar ordinance,”66 arrest 
records showed that the police began selectively enforcing trespass, 
loitering, and park closure ordinances to arrest and punish people 
who slept in public.67  The ordinance was eventually challenged in a 
class action suit in Pottinger v. Miami.68  The plaintiffs who 
represented the nearly 6000 homeless people in the city claimed that 
the ordinances violated their Eighth Amendment rights and resulted 
in cruel and unusual punishment because they had no alternatives but 
to sleep in public and had not chosen to be homeless.69  They also 
argued that the laws violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to 
equal protection.70 
The court recognized that the state of homelessness was rarely, if 
ever, chosen and accepted.71  Expert evidence showed that it was the 
result of different factors beyond a person’s control, including 
financial difficulties, as well as mental and physical illnesses.72  The 
court also noted that the ordinances were overbroad in that they 
allowed the homeless to be arrested for “harmless, inoffensive 
conduct that they are forced to undertake in public places.”73  
Ultimately, the court in Pottinger concluded that the city’s practice of 
arresting the homeless for engaging in innocent acts like sleeping in 
public constituted a cruel and unusual punishment and violated a 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1992).  
Moreover, the city also mandated the closing of parks between 10 PM and 7 AM. See 
id. at 1560 n.12. 
 65. See id. at 1564.  Notably, although there were approximately 700 beds in the 
city’s homeless shelters, 200 were reserved for people who qualified through certain 
programs. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1558 n.8 (citing Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940 (11th 
Cir. 1987)). 
 67. Id. at 1566–67. 
 68. See generally id. 
 69. Id. at 1561. 
 70. Id. at 1578. 
 71. Id. at 1563–64. 
 72. Id. at 1558, 1564–65. 
 73. Id. at 1577. 
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person’s right to equal protection under the law.74  Moreover, the 
court enjoined the city from arresting the homeless and from 
enforcing laws that punish the homeless for innocent public conduct, 
beyond their control, which they must engage in as part of their 
existence.75  Following the decision, a settlement referred to as the 
“Pottinger Agreement” was reached which prevented violations 
based on “life-sustaining conduct” except in certain circumstances 
where available alternatives to the conduct were made known to the 
homeless person and that person refused it.76 
A similar law which comprehensively banned public sleeping 
existed in Los Angeles until it was struck down as unconstitutional in 
2006.77  The next year, a settlement was reached which limited its 
enforcement between certain hours.78  The ordinance originally 
stated: “No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, 
sidewalk or other public way,” and made it an offense punishable by a 
$1000 fine or six months in prison.79  At the time, there were roughly 
1000 more homeless people than available shelter spaces in Skid Row 
alone.80  In the entire county of Los Angeles, there were roughly 
50,000 more homeless people than available beds.81  Despite these 
cases, some American cities continue to prohibit sleeping in public. 
According to the National Law Center on Homelessness and 
Poverty (NLCHP), roughly eighteen percent of American cities 
impose city-wide bans on public sleeping.82  For example, a Dallas 
ordinance states: “A person commits an offense if he . . .  sleeps or 
dozes in a street, alley, park, or other public place.”83  Although the 
law was originally struck down as unconstitutional in 1994 because 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 1583–84.  Notably, the court concluded that ordinances which punish 
acts like public sleeping and eating when the individual has nowhere else to go violate 
the individual’s fundamental right to travel. Id. at 1580. 
 75. Id. at 1584. 
 76. See generally History of the Pottinger Agreement, ACLU OF FLA., 
https://aclufl.org/pottinger/history [https://perma.cc/X45X-4FQM].  Following the 
Pottinger Agreement, a homeless person can only be ticketed for life-sustaining 
conduct if a shelter has available space, the person was offered access to that shelter, 
refused to go, and subsequently committed one of the listed offenses. Id. 
 77. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 78. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 79. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123. 
 80. Id. at 1122. 
 81. Id. 
 82. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 7. 
 83. DALLAS, TEX., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 31-13; see also Johnson v. City of Dallas, 
61 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1995) (overruling the District Court’s preliminary 
injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance for lack of standing). 
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the trial court ruled that being convicted of the offense constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment,84 the decision was reversed on appeal 
one year later.85  The rationale behind upholding the law was that 
none of the plaintiffs had actually been convicted of the offense, and 
therefore lacked the requisite standing to contest the law as being a 
cruel and unusual punishment.86 
In 2004, despite the failure of the constitutional challenge, roughly 
36% of Dallas’ homeless population did not have access to some form 
of shelter.87  This meant that Dallas’ homeless population could 
continue to be arrested for sleeping in public provided they were not 
prosecuted and convicted for the offense even though there was 
insufficient shelter space to accommodate them.88  Despite having 
substantially reduced the number of chronic homeless people in the 
city, a 2015 Point in Time (PIT) count estimated that 363 of the 
roughly 3141 homeless people were unsheltered, and that the number 
of chronically homeless people had increased from the previous 
year.89 
Some state penal codes also have provisions which penalize 
sleeping in public.  For instance, a California Penal Code provision 
creates the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct for “lodg[ing] 
in any building, structure, vehicle, or place, whether public or private, 
without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1994). 
 85. See Johnson, 61 F.3d at 445. 
 86. Id. at 444–45. 
 87. See AUSTIN/TRAVIS CTY. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. DEP’T, A COMPARISON OF 
HOMELESS SERVICES AMONG FIVE CITIES UTILIZING EXISTING DATA: AUSTIN, 
DALLAS, HOUSTON, SAN ANTONIO, AND SEATTLE 6 (2005), 
http://canatx.org/homeless/documents/HomelessServiceComparisonFiveCities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CN49-VZ3M] [hereinafter COMPARISON OF HOMELESS SERVICES]; 
see also Justin Cook, Down and Out in San Antonio: The Constitutionality of San 
Antonio’s Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 8 SCHOLAR 221, 223 (2006) (citing 
COMPARISON OF HOMELESS SERVICES).  All five cities studied had insufficient shelter 
space to accommodate the homeless. Cook, supra, at 223.  
 88. See Eric Nicholson, Dallas Police Are Now Rounding Up Homeless People 
for “Sleeping in Public” Downtown, DALLAS OBSERVER (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-police-are-now-rounding-up-homeless-
people-for-sleeping-in-public-downtown-7121564 [https://perma.cc/Q3RG-JLQG]. 
 89. METRO DALLAS HOUS. ALL., 2015 POINT-IN-TIME HOMELESS COUNT AND 
SURVEY REPORT 6 (2015), http://www.mdhadallas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
2015-PIT-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/947D-FQMH]; see also Eric 
Nicholson, Dallas’ Neverending Crackdown on Sleeping While Homeless, DALLAS 
OBSERVER (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-neverending-
crackdown-on-sleeping-while-homeless-7971590 [https://perma.cc/372J-XN4].  
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possession or in control of it.”90  Yet according to 2012 statistics, only 
35% of homeless persons in the state have shelter on a particular 
night.91  If the homeless sleep on public property, they can be ticketed 
or arrested for disorderly conduct.92  Yet if they sleep on another 
person’s private property without their permission, they can be 
ticketed for trespassing.93  Even homeless persons themselves may be 
unaware of a public place where they can sleep without being 
penalized.  In a 2013 survey, only a quarter of the homeless persons 
surveyed stated they knew of a public place where they could legally 
and safely sleep.94 
2. Anti-Public Camping Laws 
Other laws do not specifically ban sleeping in public, but forbid 
camping or erecting temporary shelters in public despite a lack of 
available shelter space.95  Without these temporary shelters, homeless 
people are unable to sleep outside without exposing themselves to 
low temperatures, rain, wind, or snow.96  In 2005, the city of San 
Antonio approved a city ordinance which banned camping in any 
public place, unless the person had permission or paid for a daily 
permit.97  Around that time, there were roughly only enough 
emergency shelter spaces for half of the homeless population.98 
                                                                                                                 
 90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2013); see also BERKELEY LAW POLICY 
ADVOCACY CLINIC, CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS: THE GROWING 
ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-HOMELESS LAWS IN THE GOLDEN STATE, 7 
(2015) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS]. 
 91. See Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Criminalizing 
Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197, 201 (2014) 
(citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. OFF. OF COMM. PLAN. AND DEV., THE 
2012 POINT-IN-TIME ESTIMATES OF HOMELESSNESS: VOLUME I OF THE 2012 ANNUAL 
HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT 3 (2012)). 
 92. PENAL CODE § 647(e). 
 93. See Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm 
for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. LEGAL & SOC. PROBS. 293, 321 
n.168 (1996). 
 94. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 16. 
 95. See id. at 18–19. 
 96. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, para. 28 (Can. B.C.).  
 97. Cook, supra note 87, at 223 (citing SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES, §§ 21–28 (2005)).  Moreover, the cost of an overnight permit for 
camping in a public area is $20 and requires a reservation. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES, §§ 22–25 (2016). 
 98. Cook, supra note 87, at 230 (noting there were roughly 3300 homeless persons 
yet only approximately 1617 shelter beds in the year 2004); see also COMPARISON OF 
HOMELESS SERVICES, supra note 87. 
756 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
Two similar situations occurred in the province of British 
Columbia, Canada.  The first occurred in the city of Victoria, where 
there were over 1000 homeless persons but only 141 regular shelter 
spaces, and 326 shelter spaces in cases of extreme weather.99  At the 
time, bylaws prohibited setting up tents or shelters in public parks or 
on streets.100  Experts testified at trial that if people tried to sleep 
without shelter, they exposed themselves to the elements and 
associated risks of developing skin infections, frostbite, hypothermia, 
and certain communicable diseases.101  According to the monthly 
weather averages for the city, the average low temperature was below 
ten degrees Celsius (fifty-one degrees Fahrenheit) for eight months of 
the year.102  When the City obtained an injunction to enforce the 
bylaws which would result in the dismantling of the camp, a group of 
homeless persons brought a constitutional challenge to the bylaws so 
as to enjoin their enforcement.103  Notably, they contended that 
obeying the bylaws exposed them to the risk of injury and death by 
preventing them from erecting shelter which would otherwise protect 
them from the elements.104  They argued that the ordinances deprived 
them of their right to life, liberty, and security of the person 
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Canadian Charter and in a manner 
that was not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.105 
In Canadian law, establishing a violation of a Section 7 
constitutional right entails a two-step analysis, where the court must 
first conclude that a person’s constitutional right to either life, liberty, 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Adams, 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, at para. 28. 
 100. See id. at paras. 22–23 (citing City of Victoria, B.C., Parks Regulation Bylaw 
No. 07-059 §§ 14(1)(d), 16(1) (Can.) (prohibiting “taking up a temporary abode over-
night” in parks and erecting tents in public parks without the council’s permission)); 
City of Victoria, B.C., Streets and Traffic Bylaw, No. 92-84 §§ 73, 74 (Can.) (creating 
an offense for erecting temporary shelters on streets); see also Sarah Buhler, 
Cardboard Boxes and Invisible Fences: The Homeless and Public Space in City of 
Victoria v. Adams, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 209, 211–13 (2009). 
 101. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2008] B.C.S.C. 1363, paras. 67–68 (Can.). 
 102. See Victoria, B.C. Weather and Climate, TOURISM VICTORIA (2012), 
http://www.tourismvictoria.com/plan/climate/ [https://perma.cc/M2JM-H6VK]. 
 103. See Adams, [2008] B.C.S.C. 1363, para. 2. 
 104. See id. at para. 108. 
 105. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.), provides: 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
See also Sarah E. Hamill, Private Property Rights and Public Responsibility: Leaving 
Room for the Homeless, 30 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 91, 108–09 (2011). 
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or security of the person was violated.106  If this is satisfied, the court 
must then examine whether the deprivation breached a principle of 
fundamental justice.107  Principles of fundamental justice “are about 
the basic values underpinning [Canada’s] constitutional order”108 and 
are “found in the basic tenets . . . of [the country’s] legal system,”109 
and include the principles that laws cannot be arbitrary,110 
overbroad,111 or vague,112 amongst others. 
The Court concluded that the provisions were a form of state 
action that impaired a homeless person’s ability to protect themselves 
from the elements and from different forms of harm, and therefore 
resulted in a deprivation of their right to life, liberty, and security of 
the person.113  Moreover, they concluded that the deprivation 
breached the principle of fundamental justice and that parts of the 
law were overbroad.114  In their words: 
The prohibition on shelter contained in the Bylaws is overbroad 
because it is in effect at all times, in all public places in the City.  
There are a number of less restrictive alternatives that would further 
the City’s concerns regarding the preservation of urban parks.  The 
City could require the overhead protection to be taken down every 
morning, as well as prohibit sleeping in sensitive park regions.115 
As a result, the portions of the law which prevented the homeless 
from erecting overnight temporary shelters in parks were rendered 
inoperative due to their unconstitutionality.116 
The second situation occurred in the city of Abbotsford, British 
Columbia.  In Abbotsford v. Shantz, a series of bylaws prohibited 
people from erecting temporary shelters in public areas.117  At the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, paras. 105–06 
(Can.). 
 107. Id. at para. 105. 
 108. Canada (Att’y General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, para. 96 (Can.). 
 109. See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 487 (Can.). 
 110. See R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (Can.). 
 111. See Bedford, 3 S.C.R. 1101, at paras. 112–13 (Can.). 
 112. See R. v. Levkovic, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 204 (Can.). 
 113. Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009]100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, paras. 82–89 (Can. B.C.). 
 114. Id. at paras. 114–16, 166. 
 115. Id. at para. 116. 
 116. See id. at para. 166 (finding the law unconstitutional pursuant to Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K)). 
 117. See Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz, [2015] B.C.S.C. 1909, para. 124 (Can. B.C.); 
Abbotsford, B.C., Good Neighbor Bylaw, Bylaw No. 1256-2003 (Can.); Abbotsford, 
B.C., Consolidated Parks Bylaw, Consolidated Parks Bylaw, 1996, Bylaw No. 160-95 
(Can.). 
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time the ordinances were enforced, there were roughly 151 homeless 
people, but only roughly 25-30 emergency shelter beds at the local 
Salvation Army, as well as roughly 100 other beds available at 
abstinence-based addiction treatment centers.118  The Salvation Army 
was frequently over capacity.119  Individuals were often turned away, 
could not stay for more than thirty consecutive days, could only enter 
and stay if they were sober, and were banned for minor rule 
violations.120  This presented a particular problem for many of the 
city’s homeless, who suffered from drug or alcohol addictions.121  
Other types of shelter had monthly rents costing over $375 per month 
and which the homeless could not afford.122  This led the trial judge to 
reject the notion that the homeless people of the city were choosing 
to live in public and conclude: 
In addition, to assert that homelessness is a choice ignores realities 
such as poverty, low income, lack of work opportunities, the decline 
in public assistance, the structure and administration of government 
support, the lack of affordable housing, addiction disorders, and 
mental illness.  I accept that drug and alcohol addictions are health 
issues as much as physical and other mental illnesses.  Nearly all of 
the formerly homeless witnesses called by DWS gave evidence 
relating to some combination of financial desperation, drug 
addiction, mental illness, physical disability, institutional trauma and 
distrust, physical or emotional abuse and family breakdown which 
led, at least in part, the witness becoming homeless. 
Given the personal circumstances of the City’s homeless, the shelter 
spaces that are presently available to others in the City are 
impractical for many of the City’s homeless.  They simply cannot 
abide by the rules required in many of the facilities that I have 
discussed above, and lack the means to pay the required rents at 
others.  While some of those who are amongst the City’s homeless 
have declined available shelter, I am satisfied that at the present 
time there is insufficient accessible shelter space in the City to house 
all of the City’s homeless persons.123 
Similar to the Adams case, the court concluded that the bylaws 
deprived the homeless of their constitutional right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person in a way that breached the principle of 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Shantz, [2015] B.C.S.C. 1909, at paras. 34, 52, 61–62. 
 119. Id. at paras. 52–53. 
 120. Id. at para. 54. 
 121. Id. at para. 74. 
 122. Id. at paras. 57–60. 
 123. Id. at paras. 81–82. 
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fundamental justice that laws cannot be overbroad.124  As a result, the 
court declared portions of the laws which prevented the homeless 
from lawfully establishing overnight shelter to be unconstitutional, 
rendering them inoperative.125  Ultimately, the decision resulted in 
the homeless being allowed to erect temporary shelters between 7 PM 
and 9 AM.126 
When laws impose comprehensive bans on conduct, such as public 
sleeping even though no alternatives are available, there is drastic 
disparity in the ability to obey the law on a consistent basis between 
those who have access to housing and those who do not.  In these 
cases, adherence to the law by the homeless on a consistent basis 
becomes the exception rather than the rule, whereas adherence to the 
law would be the rule for those with access to housing.  Moreover, the 
possibility to adhere to the law is largely a matter of chance.  One 
could conclude that, although it is not outright impossible for every 
homeless person to obey a law which comprehensively bans sleeping 
in public, the fact that only a percentage of them could obey it on a 
consistent basis renders adherence to it particularly difficult, 
arbitrary, and random. 
B. City-Wide Anti-Begging Laws and Lack of Sufficient Income 
1. Homelessness and Panhandling 
Laws which penalize the homeless often prohibit begging or 
panhandling.127  As I argue, these laws can be impossible to respect 
because in some cases, there may be no other reasonable means for 
the homeless to obtain enough money to survive without resorting to 
begging.128  This lack of reasonable alternative means that in some 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. at para. 204 (concluding that the provisions violated the principle of 
fundamental justice that laws cannot produce grossly disproportional effects in 
pursuing the objective in question, explaining “[g]ross disproportionality describes 
state actions or legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be 
disproportionate to any legitimate government interest.  This principle is infringed if 
the impact of the restriction on the individual’s life, liberty or security of the person is 
grossly disproportionate to the object of the measure.”) (citing Can. (Att’y General) 
v. PHS Comm. Servs. Soc’y, [2011] S.C.R. 44, para. 133 (Can.)). 
 125. Id. at paras. 279–80. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 20–21; Damian Collins & Nicholas 
Blomley, Private Needs and Public Space: Politics, Poverty, and Anti-Panhandling 
By-Laws in Canadian Cities, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC—PRIVATE 
DIVIDE 40–41 (Law Comm’n of Can. ed., 2003). 
 128. See, e.g., the testimony presented by the defendant in In re Eichom, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 535, 540 (Ct. App. 1998) (homeless veteran successfully raised the necessity 
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contexts, they will either beg and break the law, or, endanger their 
wellbeing by having insufficient money for food, clothing, emergency 
shelter, transportation, or other necessities.129 
Not all persons who panhandle are homeless.130  There are 
different estimates regarding the percentage of homeless people who 
resort to begging to earn their money and little data on the subject is 
available following the 2008 economic crash.  Some survey studies 
undertaken in the late 1980s in different American cities estimated 
the number of homeless people resorting to begging to range from 
anywhere between the low single-digits to numbers as high as thirty-
four percent in some cities.131 
More recently, Stephen Gaetz and Bill O’Grady conducted a 
survey-type study published in 2002, which examined how homeless 
people under the age of twenty-four earned money in the city of 
Toronto, Canada.132  Roughly twelve percent of those surveyed 
identified panhandling as their primary income-generating activity.133  
In a 2002 survey-study conducted by Rohit Bose and Stephen Hwang 
in Toronto, and with the admittedly small sample size of fifty-four 
panhandlers, approximately sixty-five percent reported being 
homeless.134  The researchers suggested that the majority of 
                                                                                                                 
defense to an anti-camping ordinance, testifying that after having lost his job, he 
usually only had access to a motel when he had enough money). 
 129. See Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In Re: Eichorn: The Long Awaited 
Implementation of the Necessity Defence in a Case of the Criminalization of 
Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 330, n.36 (2001) (citing NAT’L LAW CTR. ON 
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, DUE CREDIT 2 (1993)) (noting that the homeless often 
have to panhandle to make enough money in order to survive). 
 130. See Stephen Moss, Who Hails the Get-Up-and-Go Spirit of the Beggar on 50k 
a Year?, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/jun/06/beggar-50k-year-london [https://perma.cc/Q3CB-8XWQ] (describing a 
London, England area beggar who made roughly 50,000 GBP per year begging,  
spent his money gambling or in amusement arcades,  lived in a council flat, and was 
not homeless); Louisa R. Stark, From Lemons to Lemonade: An Ethnographic 
Sketch of Late Twentieth Century Panhandling, in HOMELESSNESS: NEW ENGLAND 
AND BEYOND 341–43 (Padraig O’Malley ed., 1992); Derek Thompson, Should You 
Give Money to Homeless People, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/03/should-you-give-money-to-
homeless-people/72820 [https://perma.cc/5YDR-42FZ].. 
 131. See Stark, supra note 130, at 342–43 (summarizing studies). 
 132. Stephen Gaetz & Bill O’Grady, Making Money: Exploring the Economy of 
Young Homeless Workers, 16 WORK, EMP., & SOC’Y 433 (2002). 
 133. Id. at 441. 
 134. Rohit Bose & Stephen Hwang, Income and Spending Patterns Among 
Panhandlers, 167 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 477, 477 (2002).  See also Bill O’Grady, 
Stephen Gaetz & Kristy Buccieri, Tickets . . . and More Tickets: A Case Study of the 
Enforcement of the Ontario Safe Streets Act, 39 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 541, 546 (2013) 
(citing Panhandling Charges Soar in 2007: Toronto Police, CBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 
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panhandlers they came in contact with “are homeless and living in 
extreme poverty” and made roughly $300 a month from panhandling, 
for a total average monthly income of roughly $640 in the year 
2001.135  The authors suggested that for those who panhandled and 
had access to some form of shelter—such as a rented room or 
subsidized housing—loss of panhandling income risked sending them 
back on the streets, as it would make rent payments infeasible.136  
One of the most recent surveys regarding the number of beggars who 
reported being homeless was conducted by the Union Square 
Business Improvement District in San Francisco.137  In a survey of 120 
panhandlers, roughly eighty-two percent reported being homeless.138  
Therefore, in certain areas, an important number of panhandlers may, 
in fact, be homeless. 
2. Comprehensive Bans on Panhandling 
According to the NLCHP, approximately one quarter of cities that 
they tracked had a city-wide ban on begging in public.139  But this 
statistic can be misleading, because many of the cities classified as 
prohibiting panhandling city-wide only impose city-wide bans against 
aggressive forms of begging.  In some of these cities, peaceful forms 
of panhandling are actually permitted in different parts of the city.  
For example, Santa Barbara is listed as a city which imposes a city-
wide ban on panhandling.140  Yet peaceful panhandling is allowed 
within the city, including in parks and in areas of the city not 
otherwise restricted.  Only aggressive forms of panhandling and 
soliciting a captive audience (e.g., where one solicits a person within a 
                                                                                                                 
2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2007/08/17/panhandlers-
police.html [https://perma.cc/K3VS-V6A3] (noting that police estimated that roughly 
ninety percent of tickets issued under the Safe Streets Act for prohibited forms of 
panhandling were given to persons with no fixed address). 
 135. Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478. 
 136. See id. at 478–79. 
 137. See Union Square Business Improvement District, Survey of Panhandlers In 
The Union Square Area, GLS RESEARCH (March 2013), 
http://californiadowntown.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SocialEquity_Flood.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9PL-DTFM] [hereinafter Survey of Panhandlers]; see also 
Heather Knight, The City’s Panhandlers Tell Their Own Stories, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 
27, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/The-city-s-panhandlers-tell-their-
own-stories-4929388.php [https://perma.cc/4QML-VVPV]. 
 138. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 6. 
 139. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 9. 
 140. Id. at Appendix A. 
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certain distance of an ATM, bus stop, etc.) is forbidden city-wide.141  
The same is true of an ordinance in Gainesville, Florida, which 
imposes a city-wide ban on panhandling even though people are able 
to peacefully beg on city corners, sidewalks, and in parks.142 
Some cities, however, do impose comprehensive bans on begging in 
public.  Chula Vista in California makes it an offense: 
[F]or any person at any place within the City to beg or solicit alms or 
any other thing or money for his support or for the support of 
anyone else, or for any other purpose, or to make a business of 
begging or soliciting alms, money, or thing of value, either by word 
or act or combination thereof, as hereinafter defined.143 
A law in Oakland, California, states that: “No person shall solicit 
contributions for himself or herself in or upon any public street or 
public place in the city.”144  In the past, other American cities have 
also imposed similar bans.145  In Canada, comprehensive bans on 
begging have also existed.146  For instance, in the city of Ottawa, a 
municipal bylaw enacted in 1991 banned begging in any public place, 
punishable by a fine of up to $5000.147  The law was ultimately 
repealed in the year 2000.148 
                                                                                                                 
 141. SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.50.020(C) (2015) (defining abusive 
panhandling to involve begging in a way that threatens persons, blocks their path, or 
involves touching or following them). SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 
9.50.030(B) (2015) (prohibiting active panhandling in restricted locations, such as 
within a certain distance of bus stops, ATMs, and on buses). 
 142. GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 19-79, 19-81(c)(1)-(2), 19-82(h) 
(2015); NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at Appendix A. 
 143. CHULA VISTA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.21.010 (2016), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/CA/chulavista/ [https://perma.cc/YVD6-JT89]; see 
also CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS, supra note 90, at 39 (citing the municipal 
code). 
 144. OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.18.030 (2016); NO SAFE PLACE, supra 
note 55, at Appendix A. 
 145. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1576 n.33 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(citing MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-17 (1990)) (including within the offense of “disorderly 
conduct” those who were found begging); see also ST. AUGUSTINE, FLA., CODE § 18-
8(b)(4) (stating that it shall be unlawful for any person within the city to 
“[p]anhandle, solicit or beg on any sidewalk, highway, street, roadway, right-of-way, 
parking lot, park, or other public or semi-public area or in any building lobby, 
entranceway, plaza or common area in the prohibited public area.” (2010)). 
 146. See CITY OF OTTAWA, ON, BY-LAW NO. 117-91, A BY-LAW OF THE 
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA RESPECTING PUBLIC NUISANCES (Canada) 
(May 15, 1991); see also Dina Graser, Panhandling for Change in Canadian Law, 15 
J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 45, 48 (2000). 
 147. Graser, supra note 146, at 74. 
 148. Id. at 53. 
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3. Panhandling, Lack of Reasonable Alternatives, and Lack of 
Opportunity 
The problem with comprehensive bans on begging is that for a 
variety of reasons, including criminal convictions, some homeless 
people are unable to access unemployment or welfare benefits, which 
may render securing shelter and satisfying other basic needs 
impossible without panhandling.149  Even if they do have access to 
welfare benefits, it may fall short of what is minimally required to 
access reasonable long-term housing options, let alone food and 
clothing.150  Begging may, therefore, be necessary to fill the gap 
between social assistance and the need for shelter and food.151  For 
instance, in Skid Row, Los Angeles, the cheapest available long term 
housing option was single-room-occupancy housing (SRO).152  In 
1999, the monthly rent for an SRO was approximately $379 per 
month, even though monthly welfare checks amounted to only 
$221.153  Moreover, the waiting time to access public housing was 
between three and ten years long.154 
There may also be a variety of internal factors inherent to homeless 
individuals which make them unable to access the formal economy.155  
The homeless may lack the education or skills to be formally 
                                                                                                                 
 149. STEPHEN GAETZ & BILL O’GRADY, THE JOHN HOWARD SOCIETY OF 
ONTARIO, THE MISSING LINK: DISCHARGE PLANNING, INCARCERATION, AND 
HOMELESSNESS 40–41 (2006); PATRICIA ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING 
WELFARE BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 1–9 (2002), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/women_lifesentences.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R93S-XNLT]. 
 150. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
643, 651 (2009); Stephan Baron, Street Youth Labour Market Experiences and 
Crime, 38 CAN. REV. SOC’Y & ANTHROPOLOGY 189, 190, 196 (2001). 
 151. See Jackie Esmonde, Criminalizing Poverty: The Criminal Law Power and the 
Safe Streets Act, 17 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 63, 69 (2002).  One study of homeless Toronto 
youth noted that, due to a constant lack of availability of food, panhandling or 
squeegeeing was often necessary to generate enough income for meals.  However, 
even then, the amount of income generated by these informal economic activities was 
never enough to consistently meet any of the youths’ daily food needs. See Naomi 
Dachner & Valerie Tarasuk, Homeless “Squeegee Kids”: Food Insecurity and Daily 
Survival, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1039, 1044–46 (2002). 
 152. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(explaining SRO’s are “multi-unit housing for very low income persons typically 
consisting of a single room with shared bathroom”). 
 153. Id. at 1122. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Stephen Gaetz, Safe Streets for Whom? Homeless Youth, Social 
Exclusion, and Criminal Victimization, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 423, 
430 (2004) (discussing barriers to employment of homeless youth). 
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employable,156 may possess a criminal record severely reducing their 
chances of employment,157 may be unhygienic or otherwise 
unpresentable,158 may have a mental or physical disability making it 
difficult to be employed,159 may be addicted to alcohol or to drugs,160 
or may have a combination of these different factors which would 
preclude formal employment.161  Because “housing and successful 
employment are directly related,” even the homeless seeking stable 
formal employment can be at a net disadvantage.162  Together, these 
factors have led some to the conclusion that “for the uneducated and 
unskilled, begging may be the only viable alternative to charity and 
welfare in depressed labor markets.”163 
Several combined factors may also suggest that, due to the lack of 
financial resources available to homeless persons, including 
insufficient income from social security, the homeless panhandle 
because it is their only available means to make money.164  Although 
there are media reports of some individuals making exorbitant 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See Kristin M. Ferguson et al., Employment Status and Income Generation 
Among Homeless Young Adults: Results From a Five-City, Mixed-Methods Study, 
44 YOUTH & SOC’Y 385, 387 (2012) (discussing how low education levels and limited 
work histories can reduce employability of young homeless persons). 
 157. See Helen Lam & Mark Harcourt, The Use of Criminal Record in 
Employment Decisions: The Rights of Ex-Offenders, Employers and the Public, 47 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 237, 241–42 (2003) (explaining how a criminal record “reduce[s] the 
prospect of getting a job”).  Furthermore, even having been accused of certain crimes 
but subsequently acquitted can drastically reduce a person’s prospect of employment. 
See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender 
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 756 (2007). 
 158. Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, at 172 (citing Christine Campbell & Paul 
Eid, LA JUDICIARISATION DES PERSONNES ITINÉRANTES A MONTRÉAL: UN PROFILAGE 
SOCIAL 89 (CDPDJ 2009), http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/publications/itinerance_avis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8FR-PTWG]). 
 159. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 7 (finding that in a survey of 120 
beggars near Union Square, San Francisco, the large majority of whom were 
homeless, 56% reported being physically disabled, 49% reported chronic depression, 
and 43% reported suffering from a chronic physical illness). 
 160. See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
HOMELESSNESS (2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/addiction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GB39-78ED] (estimating that, in 2003, roughly 38% of homeless 
persons were dependent on alcohol and roughly 26% abused drugs). 
 161. See Patricia K. Smith, The Economics of Anti-Begging Regulations, 64 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 549, 555, 559–60 (2005). 
 162. Michael L. Shier, Marion E. Jones & John R. Graham, Employment 
Difficulties Experienced by Employed Homeless People, 16 J. POVERTY 27, 29 
(2012). 
 163. Smith, supra note 161, at 555. 
 164. See Esmonde, supra note 151, at 66–69; see also Bose & Hwang, supra note 
134, at 477 (identifying characteristics of panhandlers in a 2001 Toronto study). 
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amounts of money from begging,165 some studies have shown that 
those who beg tend to earn little income.166  Other research shows 
that those who panhandle tend to spend most of their money quickly, 
generally to purchase food.167  They are often humiliated and feel that 
constantly asking others for money is degrading.168  Some studies 
suggest that most people do not enjoy panhandling.169  When all of 
these different factors are considered together, it begs the question of 
why people would panhandle—unless it is one of their only ways of 
making money. 
My concern is that comprehensively banning begging when there is 
no reasonable alternative demeans the dignity of the homeless by 
removing their opportunity to earn income and acquire property like 
other people.  For instance, Nussbaum has recognized that the ability 
to own property and have “property rights on an equal basis with 
others” is an essential capability to have a minimal standard of 
living.170  As some property law theorists have noted, property can 
perhaps be construed as constituting an integral aspect of our 
personhood by allowing us to have some control over our future 
through the control of our property.171  In order to flourish on a 
comparable level to other human beings, it is not sufficient that 
people are abstractly capable of owning or acquiring property, but 
rather that they have “the material resources required to nurture 
those capabilities.”172 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See Moss, supra note 130 (describing a London, England area beggar who 
made roughly 50,000 GBP per year begging, spent his money gambling or in 
amusement arcades, lived in a council flat, and was not homeless); Ron Dicker, 
Panhandler Shane Warren Speegle Says He Made $60,000 A Year Begging On 
Street, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/
23/shane-warren-speegle-says_n_1694577.html [https://perma.cc/N3X5-S8LF]. 
 166. For a summary of studies on this matter, see Smith, supra note 161, at 555–58, 
and Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478 (reporting that the average monthly 
income from panhandling in the city of Toronto was $300). 
 167. See Barrett A. Lee & Chad R. Farrell, Buddy Can You Spare a Dime? 
Homelessness, Panhandling, and the Public, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 299, 304 (2003); Bose 
& Hwang, supra note 134, at 478. 
 168. See Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478; Gaetz & O’Grady, supra note 132, 
at 441. 
 169. See Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478; Stephen E. Lankenau, Stronger 
than Dirt: Public Humiliation and Status Enhancement Among Panhandlers, 28 J. 
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 288, 298 (1999); Smith, supra note 161, at 558. 
 170. NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34. 
 171. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968 
(1982). 
 172. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 768 (2009). 
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In other words, rather than merely construing human dignity as a 
notion limited to recognizing the inherent worth of individuals, 
treating individuals with equal concern and respect also entails 
allowing them to have the opportunity to earn income as a means of 
acquiring the material resources which protect their “high and equal 
status” as members of the human community.173  Of course, the act of 
begging can itself be considered undignified.174  But if this is the only 
opportunity some homeless individuals have to acquire minimal 
necessary resources to live a life that they construe to be a meaningful 
existence, completely removing this opportunity without providing 
another demeans their dignity and ability to flourish even further.175 
III.  COMBINED APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT LAWS 
Thus far, I have examined the impact of comprehensive bans 
against certain public conduct engaged in by the homeless as part of 
their existence and why these bans are objectionable.  In this Part, I 
build on the work of Jeremy Waldron and argue that, in some cases, 
the cumulative effect of different individual prohibitions, property 
law rules, the configuration of public spaces, and certain pragmatic 
realties make it extremely difficult—if not impossible in some cases—
for the homeless to obey the law even though people with access to 
housing would have no comparable difficulty.176 
There are two particular contexts.  First, as Waldron has argued, 
the law sometimes imposes a series of individual restrictions that, on 
their own, may individually be possible to obey.177  However, the 
cumulative effect of these individual quality of life offenses and 
property law rules amount to a de facto comprehensive prohibition 
against the behavior in question by removing the alternatives.178  To 
illustrate this concept, I examine the combined consequences of 
different laws that can amount to something very near to a 
comprehensive ban on loitering. 
The second context involves the use of police discretion to enforce 
quality of life offenses, which can regulate nearly every aspect of a 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id.; see also WALDRON, supra note 24, at 14. 
 174. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 320 (noting how certain acts like publicly 
urinating or sleeping are not in themselves necessarily dignified, but that “there is 
certainly something deeply and inherently undignified about being prevented from 
doing so”). 
 175. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 320. 
 176. See id. at 316. 
 177. See id. at 316. 
 178. See id. at 315–16. 
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homeless person’s life and behavior.  As a result, no matter how 
precise an individual law prohibiting particular conduct is, police 
officers sometimes selectively enforce them in such a way that it can 
make breaking the law unavoidable for the homeless.179 
A. The Cumulative Effect of Different Individual Prohibitions 
1. Anti-Loitering Laws, Anti-Sitting Laws, and the Lack of 
Available Alternative Spaces 
In some cases, even where the law does not completely prohibit 
certain behavior, the combined effect of different laws amounts to a 
near comprehensive ban on the conduct in question, which can be 
extremely difficult to obey.180  Loitering laws aim to limit the 
continued presence of persons in certain public spaces.181  Although 
American and Canadian courts have struck down certain loitering 
laws for vagueness and overbreadth concerns,182 cities often 
responded by enacting more narrowly tailored statutes which apply to 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in 
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 
615–16 (1997); Marie-Ève Sylvestre, Disorder and Public Spaces in Montreal: 
Repression (and Resistance) Through Law, Politics, and Police Discretion, 31 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 803, 804 (2010) [hereinafter Repression (and Resistance)]. 
 180. Waldron, supra note 10, at 316. 
 181. Eileen Divringi, Public Safety or Social Exclusion? Constitutional Challenges 
to the Enforcement of Loitering Offenses, 8 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 1 (2014). 
 182. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down a California 
law prohibiting loitering in certain places and obliging loitering persons to give 
credible and reliable identification when demanded by a police officer for vagueness 
concerns related to the notion of what constituted “credible and reliable 
identification” and, thus, violated due process rights); Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down a city ordinance prohibiting “persons 
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or 
object, [and] habitual loafers” for vagueness concerns because the ordinance failed to 
give fair notice of the law to persons of reasonable intelligence); Lazarus v. Faircloth, 
301 F. Supp. 266, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (striking down a 
Florida Statute penalizing “wandering or strolling around without a lawful purpose or 
object” as well as persons who are “without reasonably continuous employment or 
regular income and who have not sufficient property to sustain them, and misspend 
what they earn without providing for themselves or the support of their families,” for 
vagueness and over breadth concerns); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. 
Colo. 1969) (striking down a Colorado statute prohibiting loitering for vagueness, 
equal protection, and due process concerns); State v. Father Richard, 836 P.2d 622 
(Nev. 1992) (striking down a Nevada statute and Las Vegas Municipal Code offense 
which prohibited loitering on private property for vagueness concerns); R. v. 
Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (Can.) (striking down a statute prohibiting persons 
convicted of certain offenses from loitering in different areas for overbreadth 
concerns). 
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specific places or are enforceable between certain times.183  These 
types of loitering offenses continue to be widely enforced in North 
America.184  For instance, in the United States, thirty-three percent of 
cities studied by the NHCLP imposed city-wide bans on loitering, 
whereas sixty-five percent banned loitering in specific places.185  
Moreover, such ordinances are often enforced in conjunction with 
trespass offenses.186  Even without a comprehensive ban against 
loitering, a combination of narrowly-tailored individual laws which 
may be possible to obey individually can collectively amount to a 
near-complete prohibition against loitering.187 
For instance, in addition to laws that specifically ban loitering, 
other statutes prohibit conduct amounting to loitering, such as “sitting 
or lying down in public,” especially on sidewalks.188  An actively 
enforced San Francisco ordinance conceived in 2011, prohibited 
sitting or lying on sidewalks between 7 AM and 11 PM, with certain 
narrow exceptions, including medical emergencies.189  Even though 
obeying this law may not be impossible and the ban is not 
comprehensive in the sense that homeless people can presumably sit 
in other places, it is important to consider how difficult it would be for 
the homeless to obey the law in light of the lack of alternatives. 
Notably, as the New York Times reported, the city removed many 
public benches around the same time.190  The number of homeless 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See Donald Saelinger, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances 
Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 551 (2006). 
 184. See Smith, supra note 93, at 304.  In Canada few, if any, narrowly-tailored 
loitering ordinances have been constitutionally challenged since the Supreme Court 
of Canada struck down the former vagrancy provision of the Criminal Code in R. v. 
Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 for overbreadth.  As will be discussed further on, many 
narrowly drafted loitering laws continue to exist; for example, those governing 
loitering in subway stations. 
 185. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 8. 
 186. Id. at 22. 
 187. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 315–16. 
 188. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 8 (finding that of the cities surveyed by 
the NLCHP, more than half prohibited sitting or lying on sidewalks). 
 189. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE, § 168. See Heather Knight, Sit/Lie Law 
Primarily Enforced in Haight, S.F. GATE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/Sit-lie-law-primarily-enforced-in-Haight-3763521.php [https://perma.cc/
4YQ7-UF82].  According to access to information requests, “422 formal warnings 
and 333 citations [were issued] in the first year.” Id.  Moreover, “[e]ighteen times, 
repeat offenders have been arrested and booked into county jail.” Id.  Full text of the 
ordinance available online at: http://sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/
Nov2010_CivilSidewalks.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKN7-779S]. 
 190. Zusha Elinson, A Renewed Public Push for Somewhere to Sit Outdoors, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2h7S1j3. 
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shelters and drop-in centers was also reduced,191 and those that stayed 
open were closed for significant periods throughout the day, forcing 
those who used the services to leave.192  Entrance to coffee shops, 
restaurants, or other private spaces, are all subject to permission by 
the owner of the establishment, under penalty of being issued a 
trespassing ticket.193  Even the homeless who stayed in public parks 
risked being punished.  If they were so tired they fell asleep between 
the hours of 8 PM and 8 AM, they could be ticketed.194 
Physical disabilities can also play a role in making it more difficult 
for the homeless to obey loitering laws.  They are often forced to 
carry all of their heavy belongings with them and as a result, they 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Heather Knight, A Decade of Homelessness: Thousands in S.F. Remain in 
Crisis, S.F. CHRON. (June 27, 2014), http://www.sfchronicle.com/archive/item/A-
decade-of-homelessness-Thousands-in-S-F-30431.php [https://perma.cc/L5HQ-E8AJ] 
(noting that compared to a decade earlier, the number of shelter beds was reduced by 
thirty percent and the number of drop-in centers was cut in half). 
 192. Many homeless shelters or resources centers are closed for different periods 
throughout the day. See, e.g., Emergency Shelter for Single Adults in San Francisco, 
HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY OF S.F.: DEP’T OF HUM. SERV. (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://www.sfhsa.org/82.htm [https://perma.cc/JPW7-7JYV].  For example, the 
Resource Centre for the Homeless located at the Mission Neighborhood Health 
Center is closed on Sundays, open between 7 AM and 12 PM on Saturdays, and 
closes at 7 PM most weeknights. See Location: Homeless Resource Center, MISSION 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR., http://www.mnhc.org/place-locations/homeless-
resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/T6JA-3M35].  The Multi Service Centre (MSC), is 
the “largest homeless shelter in Northern California,” offering shelter, food, and 
drop-in services to a maximum of 480 persons per day. See MSC Shelter, ST. 
VINCENT DE PAUL SOC’Y, S.F. (2016), http://svdp-sf.org/what-we-do/msc-shelter/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3FN-P9YB].  However, clients who sleep in the shelter must leave 
by 8AM, and drop in services are only available between 9 AM and 2:30 PM. See St. 
Vincent De Paul Society—Multi-Service Center South (MSC South), S.F. HOMELESS 
RESOURCE, http://sfhomeless.wikia.com/wiki/St._Vincent_de_Paul_Society_-_Multi-
Service_Center_South_(MSC_South) [https://perma.cc/YEZ9-ESRT]. 
 193. Waldron, supra note 10, at 297, 301. See also S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1, 
§ 25 (2013), http://police.sanfranciscocode.org/1/25 [https://perma.cc/S6VA-WUC5]; 
see also T.J. Johnston, Thousands of Tickets Handed Out to Homeless, S.F. PUB. 
PRESS (June 4, 2012), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2012-06/thousands-of-tickets-
handed-out-to-homeless [https://perma.cc/K3X9-EUKN] (describing the use of 
trespassing ordinances).  An access to information request revealed that trespassing 
offenses were some of the most common quality of life offenses enforced, comprising 
nearly nineteen percent of the total in 2011. See Dataset from Human Services 
Agency, S.F. PUB. PRESS, http://sfpublicpress.org/files/documents/hsa-homeless-
citations-2006-2011.xls [https://perma.cc/ENU6-KWLA]. 
 194. S.F., CAL., PARK CODE, REGULATIONS, art. 1, § 3.13 (2013), 
http://park.sanfranciscocode.org/3/3.13/ [https://perma.cc/3CE7-RJK7] (explaining 
that individuals can be ticketed if they have an outstanding citation, and do not 
accept social services offered by the city within thirty hours of its issuance). 
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frequently sustain injuries and experience chronic pain.195  For 
instance, a survey conducted by the Union Square Business 
Improvement District in 2013 revealed that nearly half of the 
homeless people reported suffering from a physical disability.196  
Consequently, they may not be able to reach a park or some other 
location where it is lawful to sit or lie down without further harm to 
themselves.  They may not be able to stand for long periods of time in 
places where it is forbidden to sit down.  The lack of alternatives may 
also help explain why homeless people in San Francisco were most 
frequently ticketed for unlawfully sitting, lying, and resting in public 
compared with any other offense.197  The difficulty in obeying the law 
is also illustrated by certain surveys demonstrating the frequency by 
which the homeless in San Francisco are either ticketed or told to 
move by the police.198  Notably, in a survey of 351 homeless people in 
San Francisco, 88% of those who lived on the streets reported having 
recently been told to move from a public space by the police.199  
Furthermore, nearly 85% of those same respondents reported 
receiving a citation, most frequently for committing a quality of life 
offense.200  Nearly 40% of those surveyed who lived on the streets 
reported receiving five or more citations.201 
In other cities, different laws prohibit loitering in one way or 
another in a variety of places, greatly limiting the availability of legal 
alternatives.  In the city of Montreal, a combination of municipal 
bylaws and transportation regulations are enforced to prohibit 
loitering.202  Transportation regulations prohibit loitering in subway 
stations and bus shelters, including placing one’s feet on a bench,203 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See Jessica Mackelprang, Janessa Graves & Frederick P. Rivara, Homeless in 
America: Injuries Treated in U.S. Emergency Departments, 2007–2011, 21 INT. J. INJ. 
CONTROL & SAFETY PROMOTION 289, 295 (2014); see also Stephen W. Hwang et al., 
Chronic Pain Among Homeless Persons: Characteristics, Treatment, and Barriers to 
Management, 12 BMC FAMILY PRACTICE 73 (2011) (describing the chronic pain 
experienced by the homeless). 
 196. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 7. 
 197. See CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS, supra note 90, at 18. 
 198. S.F. COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS, PUNISHING THE POOREST: HOW THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS PERPETUATES POVERTY IN SAN FRANCISCO 2 
(2015). 
 199. Id. at 27. 
 200. Id. at 27, 33. 
 201. Id. at 27. 
 202. CELINE BELLOT ET AL., JUDICIARISATION ET CRIMINALISATION DES 
POPULATIONS ITINÉRANTES À MONTRÉAL 28 (Montreal, October 2005). 
 203. Montreal, Que., By-Law R-036, 2014, §§ 1(c), 4(d) (Can.) (providing that the 
regulations are applicable to subway stations and bus shelters). 
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lying across a bench,204 sitting or lying on the floor,205 loitering by 
behaving in a way that impedes the free flow of pedestrians,206 and 
refusing to circulate when ordered.207  In Montreal, the presence of 
the homeless in subways is, therefore, largely limited, and studies 
have reported that special constables responsible for patrolling the 
subway systems frequently expel the homeless or issue them tickets if 
they loiter.208 
The number of places the homeless can lawfully go, especially in 
the winter, is therefore largely limited and contingent upon the 
permission of others to access private property.209 
The availability of places to lawfully spend one’s time is also 
constrained by the fact that parks are normally closed between 
midnight and 6 AM, and those loitering or sleeping in the parks 
during those hours can be ticketed.210  Bylaws also prohibit the 
inappropriate usage of the urban landscape in an effort to prevent 
loitering, penalizing conduct such as sitting or sleeping on top of a 
picnic table instead of sitting at it, or lying across the ledge of a 
fountain not intended for that purpose.211  Loitering while intoxicated 
in public or on the street is also a punishable offense,212 and the 
criminal code penalizes any person who “loiters in a public place and 
in any way obstructs persons who are in that place.”213 
Even when the police do not ticket offenders for breaching the 
loitering laws, they frequently expel them from public areas by 
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ordering them to move.214  Some researchers have noted that in an 
effort to avoid interactions with the police or tickets, homeless 
persons in Montreal leave public areas voluntarily when they see the 
police or special constables.215  Access to alternatives to loitering is 
limited by other logistical realities.  For example, the city of Montreal 
installed benches offering only enough space for one person to sit.216  
Spending one’s time in a shelter during the day is not a solution, as 
they are closed at different points, and when they are open, they have 
a limited capacity.217 
My concern is that the culmination of loitering prohibitions, 
property law rules, and the configuration of the urban landscape 
impacts the homeless in a unique way.218  First, it reduces their ability 
to relax and exercise their autonomy in ways that do not affect those 
with access to housing.  We rightfully recognize the importance of 
being able to relax for the sake of our mental and physical health.219  
Perhaps one can even construe relaxation as being a fundamental 
capability necessary to have a minimum standard of living, either 
encompassed within the notion of play or substantially similar to it.220  
We can conceptualize relaxation as the exercise of a person’s 
preference to do or not do something, in such a way that they have a 
sort of ownership of a moment in time which is insulated from the 
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unwanted interference of others.221  Relaxation implies that one’s 
existence is truly theirs, as they have control over how they use their 
bodies and temporarily isolate their own experience from unwanted 
intrusions, without having this choice constrained by others, judging it 
to be unworthy of consideration or respect.222  An inherent aspect of 
the ability to relax is to be able to make use of one’s time without 
having to constantly fear that the exercise of one’s preference for 
relaxation will unexpectedly be interrupted by others. 
The problem with the combined application of narrowly-tailored 
laws prohibiting loitering is that they cumulatively restrict the ability 
of the homeless to relax.  These laws affect people with access to 
housing less because they can relax or do whatever would amount to 
loitering on their private property without the risk of being penalized 
for it.  Furthermore, the fact that people have access to housing 
means that they do not have to worry about somebody granting them 
permission to relax in their homes.  So, even if the law progressively 
eliminates the duration of time they can remain in certain public 
places, their homes provide them with the opportunity to relax as 
they wish while still obeying the loitering laws.  The same is not true 
for the homeless.  The combined threat of expulsion from private 
property and of being ticketed for loitering in public places removes 
not only the opportunity to relax as part of their public existence, but 
also the ability to do so without having to worry about moving 
elsewhere. 
2. Police Discretion and the Combined Effect of Different Laws 
In some cases, individual laws may objectively be possible to obey, 
but the broad use of police discretion may make it extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to avoid breaking certain laws.  Quality of life 
offenses do not regulate how people sleep, urinate, or relax in the 
privacy of their homes.  Rather, quality of life offenses regulate the 
lawfulness of doing these things in public.223  Because the homeless 
live in public, they are constantly in the jurisdiction where quality of 
life offenses are enforced.  My concern is how difficult it is for the 
homeless to obey the litany of different laws governing their daily 
public existence when police discretion is broadly used in a 
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discriminatory way to displace or punish them, even though the same 
laws are not enforced against those with access to housing. 
For instance, in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, one of the city’s 
internal memos, describing how a new police task-force was formed 
with the specific objective of dealing with the city’s homeless 
population, was adduced as evidence.224  It described how the mission 
of the task force was to “move all vagrants and their paraphernalia 
out of Santa Ana by continually removing them from the places that 
they are frequenting in the City.”225  Similarly, in Pottinger v. City of 
Miami, internal memos revealed the city’s policy of “driving the 
homeless from public areas.”226  These memos included “elimination 
of food distribution as [a] strategy to disperse [the] homeless.”227 
Police discretion also played a central role in dispersing the 
homeless from parts of Miami.  Notably, at one point, the police 
stopped enforcing an ordinance which prohibited sleeping in public 
where a similar ordinance in the nearby city of Clearwater was struck 
down as unconstitutional.228  But this did not prevent the police from 
arresting homeless people for sleeping in public.  Arrest records, 
adduced as evidence at trial, demonstrated that the police used a 
combination of park-closure, trespass, and loitering laws as a means 
to achieve the same end.229  There have been similar complaints of 
discriminatory enforcement in other contexts.  For instance, in a study 
involving roughly 240 street youth in Toronto, Gaetz and his 
colleagues observed that nearly one third of the participants 
complained of being ticketed when they had not committed an 
offense.230 
As Professor Livingston argues, “[t]he problem with the quest for 
‘rules’ in the formulation of public order laws and their application is 
that the task of maintaining order is itself inherently one of 
judgment.”231  After all, there are insufficient resources for the police 
to address every single instance where a quality of life offense is 
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committed.232  This means that the police must necessarily use their 
judgment regarding when and how to enforce these types of laws.233  
In one scholar’s words: 
What begins to emerge is a model for law enforcement and 
police behavior quite at odds with that implicit in the bare 
bones of legislative enactment.  A realistic conceptual scheme, 
at a minimum, must take into account the following premises: 
while the legislature defines the outer limits of proscribed 
conduct, the police department defines the actual limits.  Within 
the actual limits, the police department—or worse, individual 
policemen—decides which laws shall be enforced actively and 
which passively.234 
The difficulty that the homeless have in consistently obeying the law 
is that they are routinely exposed to the judgment of those applying 
the law because they are constantly in the jurisdiction where quality 
of life laws are enforced, and so many of their behaviors are 
regulated.  When the homeless move, they are subject to selectively 
enforceable pedestrian and traffic safety laws, such as rules against 
jaywalking, even though the laws are less often enforced against non-
marginalized persons who often break these laws right in front of 
police officers.235  When the homeless are stationary, whether sitting 
or lying somewhere to rest or eat, they are subject to laws prohibiting 
obstruction of sidewalks, loitering, or littering which are 
disproportionally applied to them.236  Sleep is even regulated by laws 
governing the usage of public spaces,237 park closures,238 anti-sleeping 
or camping laws,239 and transformations of the urban landscape.240  
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Professor Sylvestre has argued that the more publicly visible the 
homeless are, the more likely they are to be punished by a variety of 
laws they cannot avoid breaking.241  For example, in Skid Row, Los 
Angeles, which is known for its highly visible homeless population of 
between 11,000 and 12,000 people,242 a recent report concluded that 
“the odds of a person receiving a pedestrian citation are between 48 
and 69 times greater in Skid Row than in the rest of the City.”243 
A brief survey of how laws have selectively been enforced against 
the homeless also demonstrates that where there is the will to 
penalize the homeless for behaviors related to their daily existence, or 
at least force them to move elsewhere, there is a way.  A few 
examples demonstrating the ingenuity in applying such ordinances 
include citing homeless persons for “littering” when they placed a 
cardboard box beneath them to sleep,244 ticketing homeless persons 
for sitting on top of a picnic table instead of at it,245 unjustifiably 
ticketing homeless people in Toronto for provincial offenses despite 
insufficient evidence to warrant a citation,246 and disproportionately 
issuing jaywalking citations to disabled homeless persons who could 
not cross the street in time with their canes or walkers.247 
IV.  THE ROLE OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
Thus far, I have explored contexts in which it may be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for the homeless to obey the law, even 
though those with access to housing have no comparable difficulty.  In 
this Part, I explore what I view to be the legal significance and 
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consequences of the fact that some laws are practically impossible for 
the homeless to avoid breaking.  In particular, I argue that although 
the homeless often invoke the necessity defense in such 
circumstances, it is far from an ideal mechanism of remedying their 
consistent lack of opportunities to obey the law.  Instead, it would 
generally be preferable to invoke the issue of impossibility to obey 
the law in three principal contexts: stimulating policy change, 
constitutionally challenging the legality of certain laws, and acquiring 
injunctions enjoining the enforcement of laws that the homeless 
cannot consistently obey. 
A. Why Defenses of Necessity Should Generally Not Be Invoked 
Despite Impossibility 
Some have argued in favor of the homeless invoking the defense of 
necessity for prohibited life-sustaining conduct they cannot avoid, 
such as sleeping in public.248  In a few cases, the defense has 
succeeded.249  In other cases, courts have rejected it.250  Generally 
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speaking, practical impossibility ought not to be advanced as the basis 
of a defense of necessity for several reasons.  First, if one accepts 
Waldron’s description of justificatory defenses, they generally apply 
only in a particular and extreme circumstance,251 rather than to 
general challenges to laws, the values underlying them, or their daily 
application.252  An often quoted paradigmatic example of the 
necessity defense involves the lost alpinist who breaks into a home to 
avoid freezing to death in winter.253  As Waldron explains, if someone 
were to invoke the defense of necessity in such a case, such a claim 
challenges the over-inclusiveness of breaking and entering or 
trespassing laws in a particular instance, rather than the values or 
assumptions which govern property law, quality of life offenses, or the 
general enforceability of such rules.254  The only claim the lost alpinist 
advances is that it is in an exceptional and acute case where the rule is 
over-inclusive and it is wrong to be punished because of the lack of 
legal and reasonable alternatives.255 
On the other hand, in cases in which laws are practically impossible 
for the homeless to obey, the basis of challenging such rules is that 
breaking the law is generally and continually unavoidable.256  
Moreover, because the breach of such rules by the homeless are the 
norm rather than the exception, claiming practical impossibility does 
not challenge the specific application of the rule to some particular 
one-off circumstance; it challenges its general and continued 
application to the homeless.  The fact that homelessness and its 
ensuing violation of laws are chronic rather than acute restricts the 
defense of necessity.257 
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The other reason for which necessity pleas will likely fail concerns 
the channel and method by which claimants challenge the application 
of rules.  Normally, the appropriate channel to challenge the 
application of certain laws or their underlying values is by either 
contesting their constitutionality, or appealing to the legislature to 
change them, rather than to let defendants take the law into their 
hands and attempt to justify their conduct after the fact.258  Indeed, 
courts often reject the latter approach.259 
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons which weigh heavily against 
the invocation of necessity for practically impossible laws applied 
against the homeless.  Notably, “the homeless are especially unlikely 
to possess either the means for asserting such a defense or the 
motivation to do so when pleading guilty results in their immediate 
release.”260  In the Ninth Circuit’s words in Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles: “Homeless individuals, who may suffer from mental illness, 
substance abuse problems, unemployment, and poverty, are unlikely 
to have the knowledge or resources to assert a necessity defense to a 
section [of the law] . . . much less to have access to counsel when they 
are arrested and arraigned.”261  Many may not even be aware of the 
extent of their rights or how to enforce them.262  Necessity claims 
would also do nothing to prevent or remedy cases where the homeless 
are arrested or displaced without being ticketed or prosecuted.263  
Also, a successful necessity plea will not lead to changes in the law for 
a large number of people; it will usually benefit only the individual for 
whom the defense was successfully invoked and perhaps “insulat[e] 
the ordinance from meaningful review.”264  Where the defense is 
invoked for actions that are truly exceptional, rather than constantly 
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reoccurring, the defense may still have merit.265  For instance, if the 
temperature drops below freezing and a person has no choice but to 
break into an abandoned building and sleep for the night to avoid 
death, the defense can apply in such an extraordinary case.266  But in 
cases where homeless individuals cannot avoid consistently breaking 
the law by engaging in conduct characteristic of their condition, the 
fact that the law is extremely difficult or impossible to avoid breaking 
should generally not be used as a foundation for repetitively invoking 
the defense of necessity. 
B. Practical Impossibility as the Foundation for Policy Change, 
Constitutional Challenges, and Injunctions 
1.  Impossibility to Obey the Law and Constitutional Challenges 
Given the limited use of the defense of necessity for repetitive and 
unavoidable breaches of the law for conduct essential to a person’s 
existence, invoking the extreme difficulty or impossibility of obeying 
the law can serve as the foundation for other means which aim to 
better protect the rights of the homeless.  These means include 
striking down ordinances penalizing conduct that is part of a person’s 
daily existence as unconstitutional, preventing the enforcement of 
such laws through the issuance of injunctions, and stimulating policy 
change through public awareness of issues of practical impossibility. 
Invoking the impossibility of obeying the law has successfully been 
advanced to lead to laws being struck down as unconstitutional where 
cities provide insufficient shelter space but still prohibit sleeping in 
public or erecting temporary shelter.267  The principal way that the 
finding of impossibility has been established is through reports 
documenting the number of homeless persons compared to shelter 
spaces and the testimony of experts.268  The advantage of employing 
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such a quantitative analysis to support fundamental rights-based 
claims is that it involves minimal abstraction and is a relatively 
straightforward means of evaluating whether the law can be 
obeyed.269  For this reason, homeless advocacy organizations 
encourage the usage of such quantitative evaluations to support 
constitutional rights based claims.270  Indeed, where there is a lack of 
such empirical evidence to support claims of impossibility, courts may 
reject such an argument.271 
One recent innovative and low-cost way of determining the 
number of homeless persons in order to eventually advance such 
claims is by conducting coordinated volunteer-based surveys or 
censuses.  For instance, in Montreal, the “I-Count” initiative involved 
the coordinated efforts of 600 volunteers walking through the streets 
of the city in order to count the number of homeless persons.272  The 
survey, conducted on March 24, 2015, gathered information including 
the number of homeless people who slept outside, in transitional 
housing, in shelters, and other places like hospitals and detention 
centers.273  It also acknowledged the existence of hidden homeless 
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people who could not be counted in the survey, including those 
staying in hotels, motels, or with friends on the night of the survey.274  
The survey broke down the number of homeless people according to 
certain factors, including gender, birthplace, aboriginality, and the 
reasons for which they became homeless.275  The total number of 
homeless people counted on the night of the survey was roughly 
3000—nearly one-tenth the number of what had previously been 
estimated in the decade prior.276  Not only do initiatives like these 
help inform local governments of the extent of homelessness so that 
they can better address the problem, but they also serve to raise 
awareness of homelessness amongst volunteers who participate, as 
well as the general public. 
The drawback to using impossibility as the basis for a constitutional 
challenge to a certain law is the possibility that other laws can be 
selectively enforced to fill the vacuum.  The evidence tendered in the 
Pottinger case provides such an example, as arrest records 
demonstrated that trespass, loitering, and park closure ordinances 
were used to fill the vacuum left by a law against public sleeping 
which ceased to be applied.277  This shows the importance of 
obtaining arrest records or statistics regarding the number of citations 
issued to the homeless in a given area.278 
2. Impossibility to Obey the Law and the Use of Injunctions 
One particularly successful and versatile way to block both the 
application of laws targeting the homeless while limiting selective 
ticketing and arrests is through the issuance of injunctions enjoining 
the police from enforcing certain laws against the homeless except in 
narrow circumstances.279  In Pottinger, the plaintiffs represented a 
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group of 6000 homeless people in Miami.280  They petitioned the 
court to have an injunction issued which prevented the police from 
enforcing certain laws prohibiting conduct they could not avoid 
engaging in as part of their survival.281  The court granted injunctive 
relief leading to the eventual establishment of the “Pottinger 
Agreement,” where the homeless could not be arrested or ticketed 
for such conduct unless the arresting officers informed the person of 
the existence of a shelter, the shelter had available space, and the 
homeless person still refused to go there.282  
Empirical data concerning the lack of available alternatives to the 
homeless, such as shelter spaces, in addition to arrest or citation 
records demonstrating disproportional patterns of enforcement 
against the homeless, have successfully been invoked in order to have 
such injunctions granted.283  Indeed, the NLCHP has encouraged the 
acquisition of such statistics through independent reports, public 
records, and Access to Information Requests to support the eventual 
granting of such relief.284 
3. Impossibility to Obey the Law and Policy Change 
Lastly, establishing the impossibility of obeying the law can 
stimulate policy change and identify the extent to which homelessness 
is currently penalized.  In Seattle, Washington, “trespass 
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admonishments” banned homeless people from accessing private 
property open to the public, such as stores, coffee shops, or entire 
business complexes.285  At the same time, conduct such as sitting or 
lying on sidewalks,286 camping in unauthorized areas,287 and 
obstructing sidewalks by making people take evasive action,288 were 
all prohibited.  Persons who had unlawfully camped in parks or 
trespassed after closing hours could be issued orders which banned 
them from re-entering, leaving them with few other places to go.289  
As the Seattle Times observed, “the homeless are sometimes 
penalized for their ‘existence’ not for their ‘behavior.’”290  Following 
advocacy initiatives in partnership with the NLCHP to reduce these 
restrictions, the city removed the “trespass admonishments” ban in 
2010.291  Moreover, the number of citations issued to the homeless has 
decreased significantly since that year.292  Advocacy, therefore, 
brought about important policy initiatives to make obeying the law 
possible. 
A similar policy change also occurred in New Brunswick, New 
Jersey through advocacy and political pressure.  John Fleming, who 
begged from a wheelchair carrying a sign that read “Broke—Please 
Help—Thank you—God Bless You” was ticketed four times in two 
                                                                                                                 
 285. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 247, at 46.  Moreover, persons could even 
be banned from entering bus shelters, property belonging to the Department of 
Public Transportation, shopping malls, and even hospitals. See KATHERINE BECKETT 
& STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA 74–
76 (2010). 
 286. See e.g., SEATTLE WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 15.48.040 (2013) (prohibiting 
sitting or lying on a sidewalk between 7 AM and 9 PM in the Downtown and other 
commercial districts); see also JUSTIN OLSON & SCOTT MACDONALD, WASHINGTON’S 
WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR 
ENFORCEMENT 10 (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015) (noting that conduct such as sleeping in 
doorways was prosecuted under trespass provisions). 
 287. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.250 (2013). 
 288. Id. § 12A.12.015(B)(1) (2013).  As noted in “related cases” at the bottom of 
the offense definition, the ordinance was upheld as constitutional in Seattle v. 
Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Wash. 1990). 
 289. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.278 (2013); see also SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.250 (prohibiting camping in parks except in 
authorized areas); BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 285, at 73–78. 
 290. See Taso Longos, Using Imagination to Empower the Homeless, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/using-imagination-to-
empower-the-homeless/ [https://perma.cc/HQM2-VN39]. 
 291. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 247, at 46. 
 292. OLSON & MACDONALD, supra note 286, at 15.  One notable exception to this 
was continued penalization of parking a trailer or camper on the street, in violation of 
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.72.430. 
2016] HOMELESSNESS 785 
months for panhandling on streets and sidewalks.293  The city 
ordinance banned begging “on any street or sidewalk within the city 
when not authorized to do so.”294  However, only organizations were 
able to obtain permits, which prevented homeless persons from 
lawfully being able to beg on the sidewalks or streets.295  Given the 
fact that Mr. Fleming was handicapped, it is unclear where he was 
supposed to lawfully beg in order to meet his basic needs, because the 
act of “repeated[ly] attempting to stop passers-by” in parks, streets, 
or any other public place was also penalized.296  Following mounting 
media coverage, and a complaint filed by the ACLU and the New 
Jersey Coalition to End Homelessness, the city decided to change the 
ordinance.297 
Reports and research can also act as important ways of informing 
different levels of government about the different police and 
legislative practices which penalize the homeless, leading to concrete 
change.298  For instance, the research of Professor Sylvestre and the 
Quebec Human Rights Commission299 regarding the disproportionate 
practices of ticketing the homeless for largely unavoidable quality of 
life offenses in the city of Montreal has led to several important policy 
changes.300  For example, the Montreal police created a unit 
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specializing in homelessness which involves pairing police officers 
with outreach workers in order to better help the homeless 
population while decreasing the number of tickets issued to them.301  
The city has also recently designated an ombudsman in charge of 
protecting the rights of the homeless and finding solutions to the 
problems they routinely face.302 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that in three particular contexts, it can be extremely 
difficult—if not impossible—for the homeless to avoid breaking the 
law, even though people with access to housing would have no such 
trouble.  First, individual laws may impose comprehensive bans 
against certain public behaviors, which the homeless cannot avoid 
engaging in as part of their existence.  Second, even where the bans 
are not comprehensive, the combined effect of property laws and 
quality of life offenses may amount to a near comprehensive ban 
which can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obey.303  Third, 
the cumulative effect of the different laws which regulate nearly every 
aspect of a homeless person’s public life can be discretionarily 
enforced to the point that breaking the law can become an inevitable 
part of their existence. 
Furthermore, laws which are impossible for the homeless to obey 
are objectionable for several reasons.  Notably, these types of laws 
ignore homeless persons’ capacity for self-determination and demean 
their dignity and autonomy in different ways.304  When the homeless 
are arrested or punished for laws that are impossible to obey, the 
breach of legal rules is treated as if it were a conscientious decision 
despite the lack of available alternatives.  These types of laws 
therefore disregard homeless persons’ capacities as rational agents 
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who assess rules in deciding how to live their daily lives and shape 
their futures.  These laws may also ignore their limited opportunities 
to obey certain rules.305  Laws that are impossible for the homeless to 
obey fail to recognize how they are equally deserving of concern or 
respect like other members of the community.  This is most notably 
the case where laws prohibit erecting temporary shelters even though 
adhering to such a rule would needlessly expose the homeless to 
physical and psychological harm.306  More generally, however, the law 
treats their inability to obey the law as something that does not 
matter or, perhaps, as an inconsequential trade-off in creating rules 
that govern public spaces. 
Increasingly, the reality of how difficult it is for the homeless to 
obey the law on a consistent basis is being established through the 
acquisition of empirical data, such as surveys, reports, police records, 
and information obtained through Access to Information requests.307  
Moreover, such information is notably being used as the foundation 
for constitutional rights based arguments, the granting of injunctions, 
and instituting policy changes, to underpin a variety of successful 
claims to better defend the homeless against laws they cannot avoid 
breaking. 
Even though Anatole France famously and accurately remarked 
that “the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges,” it is 
clear that the apparent neutrality of such legislation frequently does 
not extend into its application.  While laws continue to ban acts such 
as sleeping or camping in public for both those with access to housing 
and those without it, the difference in ability to obey such a law is 
stark.  Indeed, the gulf between the two may be as wide as the 
difference between doing the possible and impossible. 
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